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Insufficient data to determine institutional momentum.
Data as of Q3 2026
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Ownership trend chart requires at least 2 quarters of data.
More quarterly data is being processed.
Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
The dividend exceeds free cash flow (107%) — funded from the balance sheet or debt, a red flag if it persists. Last year: $246.5M dividends + $0 buybacks = $246.5M returned on $231.4M FCF.
1 consecutive years of dividend increases · 325%/yr.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 2 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A cash-return story — far more went to shareholders than back into the business (mature, low-reinvestment).
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: 10%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 2 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROE 10% against ROIC 10% — 0% of the return on equity comes from leverage and buybacks rather than from the operating business.
Equity is the year-end figure. On average equity over the two year-ends, ROE is 11.3% — the two diverge when buybacks or issuance move equity during the year.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on CBC: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
A reverse discounted cash flow is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
Leverage ratios is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.”
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Pretax Income | $506.6M | $393.7M |
| Income Tax Expense | $115.7M | $87.9M |
| Net Income | $390.9M | $305.8M |
| Per Share | ||
| EPS (Basic) | $1.75 | $1.39 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.75 | $1.39 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 222.4M | 220.6M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 222.4M | 220.6M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Ranked against 19 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STT | $46.2B | 18.1× | — | 3.3× | 7.3% | — | 21.1% | 10.6% | 10.6% | — | 388 |
| NTRS | $30.9B | 19.4× | — | 3.8× | -2.5% | — | 21.5% | 13.4% | 13.4% | — | 272 |
| CFG | $26.7B | 16.5× | — | 3.2× | 5.6% | — | 22.2% | 7.0% | 4.9% | — | 319 |
| FCNCA | $26.1B | 14.2× | — | 2.7× | -2.2% | — | 23.1% | 9.9% | 3.8% | — | 162 |
| ALLY | $11.6B | 16.1× | — | 1.5× | -3.3% | — | 10.8% | 5.5% | 2.5% | — | 140 |
| CBC | $8.6B | 20.5× | — | — | — | — | — | 10.3% | 10.3% | — | 25 |
| UCB | $4.4B | 14.0× | — | 4.1× | 11.7% | — | 30.9% | 9.0% | 8.5% | — | 84 |
| FBP | $4.0B | 12.2× | — | 3.1× | 2.4% | — | 27.5% | 17.5% | 15.3% | — | 67 |
| FHB | $3.1B | 11.4× | — | 3.5× | 8.9% | — | 31.4% | 10.0% | 10.0% | — | 74 |
| BUSE | $2.4B | 19.6× | — | 3.3× | 55.7% | — | 18.8% | 5.5% | 5.5% | — | 61 |
| GABC | $1.8B | 16.0× | — | 3.8× | 37.8% | — | 23.1% | 9.7% | 8.9% | — | 39 |
| PEBO | $1.4B | 12.9× | 12.8× | 16.0× | 2.3% | — | — | 8.8% | 5.8% | 3.1× | 41 |
| UVSP | $1.1B | 12.7× | — | 3.3× | 9.6% | — | 27.7% | 9.6% | 9.4% | — | 49 |
| FMNB | $927M | 10.8× | — | 3.3× | 3.9% | — | 19.5% | 11.2% | 6.4% | — | 33 |
| WASH | $736M | 14.2× | — | 3.2× | 128% | — | 22.8% | 9.6% | 9.6% | — | 39 |
| ACNB | $665M | 18.2× | — | 3.5× | 45.1% | — | 19.3% | 8.8% | 5.0% | — | 22 |
| COFS | $530M | 17.6× | — | 2.3× | 63.6% | — | 12.4% | 6.1% | 6.1% | — | 23 |
| CFFI | $357M | 13.2× | — | 2.5× | 10.6% | — | 19.1% | 10.3% | 9.5% | — | 11 |
| MYFW | $303M | 23.1× | — | 3.1× | 7.6% | — | 13.6% | 5.0% | 5.0% | — | 17 |
| MNSB | $152M | 12.1× | — | 1.1× | -1.6% | 54.3% | 11.5% | 7.1% | 7.1% | — | 16 |
Peers = companies sharing CBC's sector (State Commercial Banks) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
Return on equity (10%) and return on invested capital (10%) are within a couple of points in FY2025, so the headline return is the operating return — there is no meaningful leverage effect to strip out.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: positive EBIT.
Fewer than three profitable years with a cash flow statement, so cash conversion cannot be judged.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: FCF / net income over 3 and 5 years, Sloan accruals, SBC as a share of revenue, SBC as a share of operating cash flow, SBC-adjusted free cash flow, free cash flow per diluted share, buybacks against SBC issued, capex vs depreciation, free cash flow against revenue, share count since the first year on file, cash conversion cycle (DSO, DIO, DPO), receivables growth against revenue growth.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: 3 years of cash flow.
Leverage is not measurable this way for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: capital adequacy metrics for this archetype.
At $35.92, free cash flow must compound 13.31%/yr for 10 years. It has no positive compounding record to compare against.
The cost of capital could not be computed for this company, so the requirement is solved at the published 10% default — a different rate would move it materially.
Top 30 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-02 | Cook Sam Bryan Executive Chairman | Grant | 8,306 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Ross John Thomas President, CEO | Grant | 26,055 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Colbert Jeremy Wayne EVP, Gen Counsel & Corp Sec | Grant | 2,362 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | 2 co-filers EVP & CIO | Grant | 2,647 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Westhues Daniel Harold SEVP & Chief Customer Officer | Grant | 3,868 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Ciroli James EVP & CFO | Grant | 16,285 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Grant | 8,761 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Hallgren Eric Andrew EVP & Chief Credit Officer | Grant | 3,257 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Kellett Scott Mckinney EVP of Wealth Management | Grant | 4,479 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Schoeneberg Carey Denise SVP & Chief Risk Officer | Grant | 1,629 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Thompson Tristan Antin Chief Comm Bk Svcs &Pymt Offcr | Grant | 2,036 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | 2 co-filers EVP & CIO | Tax withholding | 813 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Otherindirect | 9,750 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-06 | Ross John Thomas President, CEO | Open-market buy | 40,000 | $24.50 | $980k |
| 2025-11-21 | 2 co-filers Executive Chairman | Open-market buy | 38,619 | $21.00 | $811k |
| 2025-11-21 | Ciroli James EVP & CFO | Open-market buy | 17,000 | $21.00 | $357k |
| 2025-11-21 | 2 co-filers SVP & Chief Risk Officer | Open-market buy | 1,000 | $21.00 | $21k |
| 2025-11-21 | Kruse Charles E Director | Open-market buy | 2,500 | $21.00 | $53k |
| 2025-11-21 | Westhues Daniel Harold SEVP & Chief Customer Officer | Open-market buy | 4,200 | $21.00 | $88k |
| 2025-11-21 | Thompson Tristan Antin See Remarks. | Open-market buy | 480 | $21.00 | $10k |
| 2025-11-21 | Sprong Bradley Nixon Director | Open-market buy | 4,500 | $21.00 | $95k |
| 2025-11-21 | Ross John Thomas President, CEO | Open-market buy | 42,000 | $21.00 | $882k |
| 2025-11-21 | Robuck Robert Marion Director | Open-market buy | 47,619 | $21.00 | $1000k |
| 2025-11-21 | Robertson Edward Deroy Jr. Director | Open-market buy | 4,550 | $21.00 | $96k |
| 2025-11-21 | Mcclure Richard Hays Director | Open-market buy | 11,200 | $21.00 | $235k |
| 2025-11-21 | Kellett Scott Mckinney EVP of Wealth Management | Open-market buy | 1,000 | $21.00 | $21k |
| 2025-11-21 | Hermann Robert Ringen Jr. Director | Open-market buy | 47,619 | $21.00 | $1000k |
| 2025-11-21 | Hallgren Eric Andrew EVP & Chief Credit Officer | Open-market buy | 2,500 | $21.00 | $53k |
| 2025-11-21 | Goldammer Russell Lee EVP & CIO | Open-market buy | 2,000 | $21.00 | $42k |
| 2025-11-21 | Digges Charles William Jr. Director | Open-market buy | 5,000 | $21.00 | $105k |
| 2025-11-21 | Colbert Jeremy Wayne See Remarks. | Open-market buy | 2,200 | $21.00 | $46k |
| 2025-11-21 | 2 co-filers Executive Chairman | Open-market buyindirect | 9,000 | $21.00 | $189k |
| 2025-11-21 | 2 co-filers SVP & Chief Risk Officer | Open-market buyindirect | 100 | $21.00 | $2k |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.