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Held by 294 of 2,417 reporting institutions (96th percentile) — extremely crowded.
Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
Average free cash flow across the last 3 positive fiscal years (FY2023, FY2024, FY2025). Smooths the cycle. Stock compensation is NOT charged — it is added back inside operating cash flow.
To be worth $76.90 today, the market must believe free cash flow compounds -17.5%/yr for a decade (off $9.64B on the 3-yr avg basis).
On the basis ($9.53B) the requirement is -17.2%/yr. Shares issued to employees are added back in operating cash flow, so this basis treats them as free.
The market's -17.5% is more conservative than its 9-yr track record.
Default is 12.5% — this company's computed cost of capital (computed WACC), the same rate the Analysis tab discounts at.
2-stage DCF · 0.45B shares (market data) · net debt -$4.96B
Today's price is outside this grid at every discount rate shown — the assumptions it requires lie beyond the plotted range, which is itself the finding.
mean 60.5% · volatility σ 78% · implied rate exceeded in 7/9 yrs
Central path = implied -17.5%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (78%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
The dividend is comfortably covered — only 1% of free cash flow, leaving room to grow it and fund buybacks. Last year: $134.0M dividends + $0 buybacks = $134.0M returned on $15.74B FCF.
2 consecutive years of dividend increases · -3%/yr.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 10 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A cash-return story — far more went to shareholders than back into the business (mature, low-reinvestment).
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: 81%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 10 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.” Interest last disclosed in FY2023 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
Ranked against 16 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BLK | $182.2B | 33.3× | — | 7.5× | 89.3% | — | 22.9% | 9.9% | 8.1% | — | 809 |
| SCHW | $154.7B | 19.2× | — | 6.5× | 22.0% | — | 37.0% | 17.9% | 17.9% | — | 795 |
| HOOD | $82.5B | 44.7× | 35.9× | 18.4× | 51.6% | — | 42.1% | 20.6% | 20.6% | -1.9× | 425 |
| IBKR | $37.0B | 36.8× | — | 15.2× | 23.4% | — | — | 81.2% | 81.2% | — | 294 |
| RJF | $31.0B | 15.7× | — | 1.9× | 6.6% | — | 13.4% | 17.1% | 16.2% | — | 258 |
| NMR | $27.7B | 105.2× | — | 1.6× | 15.2% | — | 2.1% | 1.4% | 0.2% | — | 76 |
| FUTU | $14.2B | — | 7.1× | 4.8× | 67.8% | 87.1% | 49.6% | 28.3% | 28.3% | -0.7× | 56 |
| SEIC | $12.4B | 18.6× | — | 5.4× | 8.1% | 35.2% | 31.1% | 29.2% | 29.2% | — | 162 |
| FRHC | $11.7B | 73.2× | — | 5.3× | 9.3% | 96.4% | 7.0% | 10.3% | 10.3% | — | 26 |
| JEF | $11.3B | 17.4× | — | 1.0× | 2.9% | 98.2% | 6.3% | 6.4% | 2.4% | — | 128 |
| SF | $10.3B | 11.7× | — | 1.6× | 6.7% | — | 10.8% | 11.4% | 10.4% | — | 145 |
| MKTX | $5.8B | 24.8× | — | 6.9× | 3.6% | — | 29.1% | 21.5% | 18.1% | — | 76 |
| PIPR | $4.9B | 4.3× | — | 2.5× | 24.3% | — | 14.8% | 20.5% | 20.3% | — | — |
| VIRT | $4.8B | 10.6× | — | 1.3× | 26.2% | — | 12.9% | 29.6% | 12.9% | — | 101 |
| WT | $3.3B | 28.7× | — | 6.6× | 15.4% | — | 22.1% | 26.4% | 26.4% | — | 56 |
| MIAX | $3.1B | — | 22.2× | 2.3× | 19.6% | 31.6% | -5.1% | -7.9% | -7.9% | -3.5× | 28 |
| OPY | $1.2B | 8.3× | — | 0.7× | 14.4% | — | 9.1% | 15.1% | 15.1% | — | 18 |
Peers = companies sharing IBKR's sector (Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
Top 40 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Dividends and buybacks are cash paid out, shown here against the same year's profit for scale — not funded from it.
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | FY2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.44B 100.0% | $1.98B 100.0% | $1.56B 100.0% | $1.51B 100.0% | $1.57B 100.0% | $1.29B 100.0% | $2.58B 100.0% | $2.37B 100.0% | $1.93B 100.0% | $1.48B 100.0% |
| Selling, General & Admin | $247.0M 10.1% | $314.0M 15.9% | $211.0M 13.6% | $165.0M 11.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Expense | — | — | $3.44B 220.7% | $1.02B 67.6% | $224.0M 14.3% | $261.0M 20.3% | $643.0M 24.9% | $463.0M 19.6% | — | — |
| Pretax Income | $4.77B 195.5% | $3.69B 186.9% | $3.07B 197.1% | $2.00B 132.7% | $1.79B 114.0% | $1.26B 97.6% | $1.16B 44.8% | $1.20B 50.5% | $1.05B 54.4% | $761.0M 51.6% |
| Income Tax Expense | $414.0M 17.0% | $288.0M 14.6% | $257.0M 16.5% | $156.0M 10.4% | $151.0M 9.6% | $77.0M 6.0% | $68.0M 2.6% | $71.0M 3.0% | $256.0M 13.3% | $62.0M 4.2% |
| Net Income | $4.36B 178.6% | $3.41B 172.3% | $2.81B 180.6% | $1.84B 122.3% | $1.64B 104.3% | $1.18B 91.6% | $1.09B 42.2% | $1.13B 47.5% | $793.0M 41.2% | $699.0M 47.4% |
| Per Share | ||||||||||
| EPS (Basic) | $2.23 | $1.75 | $1.43 | $3.78 | $3.27 | $2.44 | $2.11 | $2.30 | $1.09 | $1.28 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.22 | $1.73 | $1.42 | $3.75 | $3.24 | $2.42 | $2.10 | $2.28 | $1.07 | $1.25 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 440.9M | 432.4M | 419.9M | 100.5M | 94.2M | 79.9M | 76.1M | 73.4M | 69.9M | 66.0M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 443.9M | 436.0M | 423.4M | 101.3M | 95.0M | 80.6M | 76.8M | 74.3M | 70.9M | 67.3M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Where each multiple sits in its own 14-yr range · 93th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 14-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROE 81% against ROIC 81% — 0% of the return on equity comes from leverage and buybacks rather than from the operating business.
Equity is the year-end figure. On average equity over the two year-ends, ROE is 90.4% — the two diverge when buybacks or issuance move equity during the year.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SG&A | — | — | — | — | 11.0 | 13.6 | 15.9 | 10.1 |
| Income Tax | 3.0 | 2.6 | 6.0 | 9.6 | 10.4 | 16.5 | 14.6 | 17.0 |
| Net Income | 47.5 | 42.2 | 91.6 | 104.3 | 122.3 | 180.6 | 172.3 | 178.6 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on IBKR: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
| Fiscal year | Gross margin | Operating margin | Net margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2016 | not reported | not reported | 47.4% |
| FY2017 | not reported | not reported | 41.2% |
| FY2018 | not reported | not reported | 47.5% |
| FY2019 | not reported | not reported | 42.2% |
| FY2020 | not reported | not reported | 91.6% |
| FY2021 | not reported | not reported | 104.3% |
| FY2022 | not reported | not reported | 122.3% |
| FY2023 | not reported | not reported | 180.6% |
| FY2024 | not reported | not reported | 172.3% |
| FY2025 | not reported | not reported | 178.6% |
Return on equity (81%) and return on invested capital (81%) are within a couple of points in FY2025, so the headline return is the operating return — there is no meaningful leverage effect to strip out.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: positive EBIT.
Free cash flow of $15.74B exceeds revenue of $2.44B, so the cash flow statement is carrying customer balances rather than earnings. Cash conversion cannot be read here.
Banks, brokers, insurers and payment companies run customer money through operating cash flow. Treat free cash flow, FCF yield and any DCF on this company as unreliable.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: free cash flow attributable to the company.
No debt, so there is no leverage path to distress.
Balance sheet at 2025-12-31. Undrawn revolving credit is not shown: the tag is collected but not yet mapped through to the API.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: net debt / EBITDA, interest coverage, stressed coverage, maturity schedule vs cash and one year of FCF, liquidity ratios.
At $81.77, free cash flow must compound -16.11%/yr for 10 years. It has done 35.08%/yr over 6 years.
| Fiscal year | FCF growth | Price requires |
|---|---|---|
| FY2020 | 209.3% | −16.1% |
| FY2021 | −27.4% | −16.1% |
| FY2022 | −33.0% | −16.1% |
| FY2023 | 15.3% | −16.1% |
| FY2024 | 93.0% | −16.1% |
| FY2025 | 81.5% | −16.1% |
The percentile ranks the FISCAL-YEAR point, because the distribution behind each strip is built from fiscal-year closes — ranking a TTM figure inside it would compare two different bases. TTM basis: TTM (share count from the last fiscal year — the TTM window reports none).
The implied rate has been matched or beaten in 4 of the last 6 years.
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-28 | Harris Lawrence E Director | Open-market sale | 25,000 | $82.61 | $2.1m |
| 2026-10-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $85.42 | $2k |
| 2026-09-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $94.53 | $2k |
| 2026-08-03 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
| 25 |
| $87.03 |
| $2k |
| 2026-07-31 | Nemser Earl H Vice Chairman | Grantindirect | 803,568 | $87.99 | $70.7m |
| 2026-07-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $88.03 | $2k |
| 2026-06-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $86.10 | $2k |
| 2026-05-08 | Brody Paul Jonathan Chief Financial Officer | Tax withholding15d late | 82,920 | $84.42 | $7.0m |
| 2026-05-08 | Mendonca Denis Chief Accounting Officer | Tax withholding15d late | 11,157 | $84.42 | $942k |
| 2026-05-08 | Galik Milan Chief Executive Officer | Tax withholding15d late | 255,039 | $84.42 | $21.5m |
| 2026-05-08 | Frank Thomas Aj Executive Vice President | Tax withholding15d late | 31,730 | $84.42 | $2.7m |
| 2026-05-08 | Nemser Earl H Vice Chairman | Tax withholding15d late | 22,486 | $84.42 | $1.9m |
| 2026-05-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $79.64 | $2k |
| 2026-04-28 | Harris Lawrence E Director | Open-market sale | 26,000 | $76.93 | $2.0m |
| 2026-04-01 | Conkling Lori A Director | Plan purchase | 25 | $68.38 | $2k |
| 2026-03-02 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Plan purchase19d late | 25 | $69.21 | $2k |
| 2026-02-25 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Plan purchase24d late | 50 | $73.21 | $4k |
| 2026-01-27 | 5 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 39,731 | $75.07 | $3.0m |
| 2026-01-27 | 5 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 20,469 | $75.75 | $1.6m |
| 2026-01-26 | 5 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 60,882 | $75.83 | $4.6m |
| 2026-01-26 | 5 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 30,817 | $76.72 | $2.4m |
| 2026-01-26 | 5 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 3,101 | $77.98 | $242k |
| 2026-01-23 | 3 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 84,935 | $77.65 | $6.6m |
| 2026-01-23 | 3 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 60,065 | $78.14 | $4.7m |
| 2026-01-22 | 3 co-filers Vice Chairman | Open-market saleindirect | 100,000 | $76.81 | $7.7m |
| 2026-01-01 | Bright Jill Director | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Peterffy William Director | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Nemser Earl H Vice Chairman | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Brody Paul Jonathan Chief Financial Officer | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Galik Milan Chief Executive Officer | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Harris Lawrence E Director | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Yuen Nicole Director | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | Repetto Richard H Director | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2026-01-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Grant20d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2025-12-31 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Grant21d late | 389 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | 2 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Grant2d late | 53,452 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | Repetto Richard H Director | Grant2d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2025-12-31 | 2 co-filers Vice Chairman | Grant2d late | 23,240 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | Peterffy William Director | Grant2d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |
| 2025-12-31 | Harris Lawrence E Director | Grant2d late | 389 | $64.31 | $25k |