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Insufficient data to determine institutional momentum.
Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Ranked against 2 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NFLX | $258.4B | 24.5× | 19.3× | 5.7× | 15.9% | 48.5% | 24.3% | 41.3% | 26.7% | 0.4× | 1,180 |
| MCS | $865M | — | 11.5× | 1.1× | 3.1% | — | 1.7% | 2.8% | 2.1% | 1.6× | 29 |
| IQ | $804M | — | 10.2× | 0.2× | -2.5% | 21.1% | -0.8% | -1.6% | -1.3% | -5.1× | 13 |
Peers = companies sharing IQ's sector (Services-Video Tape Rental) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
Top 13 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
Average free cash flow across the last 3 positive fiscal years (FY2023, FY2024, FY2025). Smooths the cycle. Stock compensation is NOT charged — it is added back inside operating cash flow.
To be worth $0.83 today, the market must believe free cash flow compounds -27.1%/yr for a decade (off $248.8M on the 3-yr avg basis).
On the basis ($174.8M) the requirement is -20.3%/yr. Shares issued to employees are added back in operating cash flow, so this basis treats them as free.
The market's -27.1% is more optimistic than its 7-yr track record.
Default is 10.0% — this company's computed cost of capital (published default — this company's cost of capital could not be computed), the same rate the Analysis tab discounts at.
2-stage DCF · 0.97B shares (market data) · net debt -$266.1M
Today's price is outside this grid at every discount rate shown — the assumptions it requires lie beyond the plotted range, which is itself the finding.
mean -98.2% · volatility σ 140% · implied rate exceeded in 1/4 yrs
Central path = implied -27.1%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (140%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned on $1.4M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 8 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A reinvestment story — most cash went back into growth rather than to shareholders.
Reinvestment has been productive — operating income grew well per dollar put in. Current ROIC on all capital: -1%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 8 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-29
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Dividends and buybacks are cash paid out, shown here against the same year's profit for scale — not funded from it.
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.90B 100.0% | $29.23B 100.0% | $31.87B 100.0% | $29.00B 100.0% | $30.55B 100.0% | $29.71B 100.0% | $28.99B 100.0% | $24.99B 100.0% |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.08B 78.9% | $21.95B 75.1% | $23.10B 72.5% | $22.32B 77.0% | $27.51B 90.0% | $27.88B 93.9% | $30.35B 104.7% | $27.13B 108.6% |
| Research & Development | $237.8M 6.1% | $1.78B 6.1% | $1.77B 5.5% | $1.90B 6.5% | $2.79B 9.1% | $2.68B 9.0% | $2.67B 9.2% | $1.99B 8.0% |
| Selling, General & Admin | $551.5M 14.1% | $3.68B 12.6% | $4.01B 12.6% | $3.47B 12.0% | $4.73B 15.5% | $5.19B 17.5% | $5.24B 18.1% | $4.17B 16.7% |
| Total Operating Expenses | $3.87B 99.2% | $27.41B 93.8% | $28.88B 90.6% | $27.69B 95.5% | $35.03B 114.7% | $35.75B 120.3% | $38.25B 131.9% | $33.30B 133.2% |
| Operating Income | $32.8M 0.8% | $1.81B 6.2% | $2.99B 9.4% | $1.31B 4.5% | -$4.48B -14.7% | -$6.04B -20.3% | -$9.26B -31.9% | -$8.31B -33.2% |
| Interest Expense | $130.1M 3.3% | $1.06B 3.6% | $159.2M 0.5% | $715.1M 2.5% | $1.35B 4.4% | $1.07B 3.6% | $914.4M 3.2% | $94.7M 0.4% |
| Interest & Investment Income | $47.8M 1.2% | $271.8M 0.9% | $257.5M 0.8% | $69.6M 0.2% | $118.6M 0.4% | $157.5M 0.5% | $402.1M 1.4% | $214.0M 0.9% |
| Other Income (Expense), net | -$41.3M -1.1% | -$959.5M -3.3% | -$956.9M -3.0% | -$1.35B -4.6% | -$1.53B -5.0% | -$943.4M -3.2% | -$967.0M -3.3% | -$676.2M -2.7% |
| Pretax Income | -$8.5M -0.2% | $851.7M 2.9% | $2.03B 6.4% | -$33.8M -0.1% | -$6.01B -19.7% | -$6.98B -23.5% | -$10.22B -35.3% | -$8.98B -35.9% |
| Income Tax Expense | $20.7M 0.5% | $61.1M 0.2% | $80.0M 0.3% | $84.0M 0.3% | $96.5M 0.3% | $23.3M 0.1% | $51.9M 0.2% | $78.8M 0.3% |
| Net Income | -$29.5M -0.8% | $764.1M 2.6% | $1.93B 6.0% | -$136.2M -0.5% | -$6.17B -20.2% | -$7.04B -23.7% | -$10.32B -35.6% | -$9.11B -36.5% |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Thin coverage — earnings barely cover interest. Effective rate ~36.5% on $356.5M of debt.
Cash of $622.7M fully covers short-term debt of $356.5M.
Mostly short-term debt (balance-sheet current vs non-current split). A year-by-year maturity schedule wasn't disclosed for this issuer.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Chief Content Officer | Other | 1,531,250 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Senior Vice President | Other | 4,812,117 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Other | 982,927 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Interim CFO | Other | 480,056 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Interim CFO | Grant | 480,056 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Chief Content Officer | Grant | 1,531,250 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Grant | 982,927 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Senior Vice President | Grant | 4,812,117 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Other | 375,056 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Senior Vice President | Other | 5,600,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Interim CFO | Other | 700,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Chief Content Officer | Other | 7,500,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Chief Content Officer | Grant | 7,500,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Interim CFO | Grant | 700,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Grant | 375,056 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 4 co-filers Senior Vice President | Grant | 5,600,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Other | 3,200,000 | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | 6 co-filers Senior Vice President | Grant | 3,200,000 | — | — |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-29
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROE -2% against ROIC -1% — -0% of the return on equity comes from leverage and buybacks rather than from the operating business.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
High operating leverage: profit moved 34.3× as fast as sales — great in an upturn, painful in a downturn.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost of Revenue | 108.6 | 104.7 | 93.9 | 90.0 | 77.0 | 72.5 | 75.1 | 78.9 |
| R&D | 8.0 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 6.5 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| SG&A | 16.7 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 15.5 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 14.1 |
| Operating Income | -33.2 | -31.9 | -20.3 | -14.7 | 4.5 | 9.4 | 6.2 | 0.8 |
| Income Tax | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| Net Income | -36.5 | -35.6 | -23.7 | -20.2 | -0.5 | 6.0 | 2.6 | -0.8 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on IQ: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
Earns -12.73pts against its cost of capital — capital is being consumed, not created.
| Period | ROIC | Cost of capital | Spread |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2019 | -117.8% | 15.7% (today's — no rate published for this year) | -133.5pts |
| FY2020 | -191.5% | 15.7% (today's — no rate published for this year) | -207.2pts |
| FY2021 | -53.6% | 59.5% | -113.2pts |
| FY2022 | 32.3% | 45.0% | -12.6pts |
| FY2023 | 22.4% | 14.5% | 7.9pts |
| FY2024 | 11.6% | 53.4% | -41.8pts |
| FY2025 | 1.7% | 14.4% | -12.7pts |
| Now | -1.3% | 15.7% | -17.0pts |
| Fiscal year | Gross margin | Operating margin | Net margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2018 | -8.6% | -33.2% | -36.5% |
| FY2019 | -4.7% | -31.9% | -35.6% |
| FY2020 | 6.1% | -20.3% | -23.7% |
| FY2021 | 10.0% | -14.7% | -20.2% |
| FY2022 | 23.0% | 4.5% | -0.5% |
| FY2023 | 27.5% | 9.4% | 6.0% |
| FY2024 | 24.9% | 6.2% | 2.6% |
| FY2025 | 21.1% | 0.8% | -0.8% |
Return on equity (-2%) and return on invested capital (-1%) are within a couple of points in FY2025, so the headline return is the operating return — there is no meaningful leverage effect to strip out.
$546M of goodwill — 52% of invested capital. The gap is what was paid above the fair value of what was bought; it is real capital shareholders provided, so neither bar is the whole answer. With goodwill over half the base, the ex-goodwill figure divides by a small remainder and moves sharply — read it as a direction, not a precise rate.
ROIC ex-goodwill is 6.04% against 2.92% reported — the return is earned on a capital base inflated by what was paid for acquisitions, not by the operating business alone.
Fewer than three profitable years with a cash flow statement, so cash conversion cannot be judged.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: FCF / net income over 3 and 5 years, Sloan accruals, SBC as a share of revenue, SBC as a share of operating cash flow, SBC-adjusted free cash flow, free cash flow per diluted share, buybacks against SBC issued, capex vs depreciation, free cash flow against revenue, share count since the first year on file, cash conversion cycle (DSO, DIO, DPO), receivables growth against revenue growth.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: 3 years of cash flow.
Stressed coverage falls to 0.2x — below the level at which interest is reliably covered.
| EBITDA decline | Interest coverage |
|---|---|
| 0% | 0.33x |
| 5% | 0.31x |
| 10% | 0.30x |
| 15% | 0.28x |
| 20% | 0.26x |
| 25% | 0.25x |
| 30% | 0.23x |
| 35% | 0.21x |
| 40% | 0.20x |
| 45% | 0.18x |
| 50% | 0.16x |
| 55% | 0.15x |
| 60% | 0.13x |
Balance sheet at 2025-12-31. Undrawn revolving credit is not shown: the tag is collected but not yet mapped through to the API.
The maturity schedule is not part of this verdict — its filing anchor is often older than the balance sheet it sits beside, so a wall inside 24 months may not be visible here.
At $0.83, free cash flow must compound -24.9%/yr for 10 years. It has done -61.72%/yr over 6 years.
| Fiscal year | FCF growth | Price requires |
|---|---|---|
| FY2020 | −290.5% | −24.9% |
| FY2024 | −40.4% | −24.9% |
| FY2025 | −99.5% | −24.9% |
The cost of capital could not be computed for this company, so the requirement is solved at the published 10% default — a different rate would move it materially.