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Insufficient data to determine institutional momentum.
Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Top 31 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Ranked against 16 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AXP | $217.1B | 21.1× | — | 5.3× | 6.4% | — | 26.2% | 32.4% | 11.9% | — | 1,026 |
| COIN | $42.4B | 36.1× | 23.1× | 5.9× | 9.4% | — | 17.6% | 8.5% | 5.9% | -3.0× | 313 |
| SOFI | $22.8B | 45.1× | — | 36.9× | 23.1% | 1.7% | 77.7% | 4.6% | 3.9% | — | 266 |
| BMNP | $22.7B | 7.3× | 49.9× | — | 84.1% | 5.1% | — | 4.0% | 4.0% | -1.1× | — |
| CHYM | $10.9B | — | — | 5.0× | 30.7% | 88.0% | -46.2% | -72.1% | -72.1% | — | 55 |
| HUT | $8.2B | — | — | 34.8× | 44.8% | 54.2% | -96.2% | -15.9% | -15.9% | — | 69 |
| WULF | $6.4B | — | — | 37.8× | 20.3% | 39.2% | -393% | -471% | -20.4% | — | 82 |
| KLAR | $5.2B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 24 |
| DAVE | $4.3B | 24.8× | 21.6× | 7.7× | 59.7% | — | 35.3% | 55.5% | 55.5% | -0.4× | 47 |
| GPGI | $3.4B | — | — | 56.2× | -85.8% | 48.1% | -227% | -55.9% | -55.9% | — | 21 |
| CIFR | $3.4B | — | — | 15.0× | 48.0% | 63.7% | -367% | -102% | -23.1% | — | 79 |
| UPST | $2.4B | 55.2× | 53.3× | 2.3× | 64.0% | — | 5.1% | 6.7% | 2.0% | 17.4× | 67 |
| CLSK | $2.1B | — | 4.1× | 2.8× | 102% | 55.2% | 47.6% | 16.8% | 12.9% | 0.9× | 79 |
| PGY | $1.7B | 22.4× | 5.1× | 1.3× | 26.1% | 42.4% | 6.3% | 17.0% | 17.0% | -0.8× | — |
| WLTH | $1.6B | — | — | 4.5× | 18.2% | 89.6% | -11.5% | -6.8% | -6.8% | — | 10 |
| KEEL | $1.4B | — | — | 6.2× | 72.0% | -8.2% | -124% | -50.8% | -23.1% | — | — |
| WD | $1.2B | 21.2× | — | 1.0× | 9.0% | — | 4.6% | 3.2% | 3.2% | — | 38 |
Peers = companies sharing KLAR's sector (Finance Services) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selling, General & Admin | $306.0M | $281.0M | $270.0M |
| Interest Expense | $667.0M | $503.0M | $297.0M |
| Net Income | -$273.0M | $21.0M | -$244.0M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
A reverse discounted cash flow is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
Leverage ratios is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.”
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-28 | 4 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Grant27d late | 19,681 | — | — |
| 2026-09-28 | 2 co-filers Chief Marketing Officer | Grant27d late | 19,681 | — | — |
| 2026-09-28 | 2 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Grant27d late | 23,499 | — | — |
| 2026-09-28 | 4 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Grant27d late | 65,457 |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
| — |
| — |
| 2026-09-15 | Moritz Michael J Director | Option exercise3d late | 8,216 | — | — |
| 2026-09-01 | 4 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Grant54d late | 104,145 | — | — |
| 2026-09-01 | 3 co-filers Chief Executive Officer | Grant54d late | 1,445,264 | — | — |
| 2026-08-26 | Siemiatkowski Sebastian Chief Executive Officer | Open-market buyindirect | 692,506 | $14.37 | $9.9m |
| 2026-08-20 | 3 co-filers Chief Executive Officer | Grant66d late | 1,099,917 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 3 co-filers Chief Executive Officer | Grant66d late | 2,021,470 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Grant66d late | 126,987 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Grant66d late | 341,917 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Grant66d late | 132,154 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Grant66d late | 509,867 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Grant66d late | 489,932 | — | — |
| 2026-08-20 | 4 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Grant66d late | 1,319,155 | — | — |
| 2026-07-30 | 4 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Option exercise87d late | 541 | — | — |
| 2026-07-30 | 4 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Option exercise87d late | 198 | — | — |
| 2026-07-30 | 4 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Option exercise87d late | 141 | — | — |
| 2026-07-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Marketing Officer | Option exercise87d late | 2,621 | — | — |
| 2026-07-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Option exercise87d late | 441 | — | — |
| 2026-06-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Marketing Officer | Grant | 13,655 | — | — |
| 2026-06-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Grant | 15,944 | — | — |
| 2026-06-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Accounting Officer | Grant | 1,076 | — | — |
| 2026-06-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Grant | 17,943 | — | — |
| 2026-06-30 | 2 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Grant | 13,655 | — | — |
| 2026-06-01 | Siemiatkowski Sebastian Chief Executive Officer | Grant24d late | 1,166,563 | — | — |
| 2026-06-01 | 2 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Grant24d late | 84,034 | — | — |
| 2026-06-01 | 2 co-filers Chief Operating Officer | Grant25d late | 84,034 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Commercial Officer | Option exercise51d late | 238 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Operating Officer | Option exercise51d late | 41 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Option exercise51d late | 48 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Marketing Officer | Option exercise51d late | 61 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Product & Design Officer | Option exercise50d late | 69 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Option exercise52d late | 127 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 2 co-filers Chief Accounting Officer | Option exercise51d late | 526 | — | — |
| 2026-04-13 | Giesecke Camilla Chief Operating Officer | Option exercise | 89 | — | — |
| 2026-04-13 | Fock David Chief Product & Design Officer | Option exercise | 70 | — | — |
| 2026-04-13 | 2 co-filers Chief Accounting Officer | Option exercise | 533 | — | — |
| 2026-04-13 | 2 co-filers Chief Technology Officer | Option exercise | 92 | — | — |
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROIC is not available for this period, so the share of ROE attributable to leverage cannot be separated out.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on KLAR: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: tax_rate.
Fewer than three profitable years with a cash flow statement, so cash conversion cannot be judged.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: FCF / net income over 3 and 5 years, Sloan accruals, SBC as a share of revenue, SBC as a share of operating cash flow, SBC-adjusted free cash flow, free cash flow per diluted share, buybacks against SBC issued, capex vs depreciation, free cash flow against revenue, share count since the first year on file, cash conversion cycle (DSO, DIO, DPO), receivables growth against revenue growth.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: 3 years of cash flow.
Leverage is not measurable this way for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: capital adequacy metrics for this archetype.
No positive free cash flow to discount, so the price cannot be expressed as a growth requirement.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: reverse-DCF implied growth, historical FCF CAGR, per-year FCF growth distribution, reporting-basis breaks, discount rate used, free-cash-flow basis (stock comp charged?).
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: free_cash_flow.