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Held by 794 of 5,944 reporting institutions (98th percentile) — extremely crowded.
Data as of Q1 2026
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Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
This company doesn't have positive free cash flow, so a reverse DCF can't be run.
Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-14
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2017
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2017 |
|---|---|
| Cost of Revenue | $7.05B |
| Gross Profit | $16.41B |
| Research & Development | $3.35B |
| Net Income | $4.05B |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
Needs two years of data.
Insufficient balance-sheet detail (needs retained earnings, working capital, equity).
Needs granular two-year detail (receivables, PP&E, D&A, SG&A) — not fully reported.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Coverage data unavailable.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.”
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-14
No standout strengths flagged.
Nothing notable to watch.
No material risks flagged.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2017 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Watch the leverage lever — a chunk of ROE comes from the balance sheet.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2017 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on SAP: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
No trend data available for this metric.
Top 40 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Ranked against 743 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSM | $10.84T | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,121 |
| NVDA | $5.13T | 43.0× | 38.5× | 23.7× | 65.5% | 71.1% | 55.6% | 76.3% | 72.4% | 0.1× | 5,582 |
| AAPL | $4.92T | 44.6× | 34.4× | 11.8× | 6.4% | 46.9% | 26.9% | 152% | 68.1% | 0.6× | 5,858 |
| MSFT | $3.75T | 28.2× | 19.9× | 11.3× | 17.8% | 67.9% | 40.3% | 30.2% | 27.7% | 0.2× | 5,944 |
| AVGO | $1.63T | 72.3× | 64.6× | 25.6× | 23.9% | 67.8% | 36.2% | 28.4% | 15.8% | 2.5× | 4,442 |
| MU | $1.04T | 121.7× | 57.4× | 27.7× | 48.9% | 39.8% | 22.8% | 15.8% | 12.9% | 0.7× | 2,894 |
| AMD | $804.3B | 186.2× | 190.3× | 23.2× | 34.3% | 49.5% | 12.5% | 6.9% | 6.5% | 0.8× | 3,059 |
| INTC | $485.4B | — | 60.6× | 9.2× | -0.5% | 34.8% | -0.5% | -0.2% | -0.2% | 5.5× | 2,495 |
| CSCO | $435.8B | 43.2× | 36.6× | 7.7× | 5.3% | 64.9% | 18.0% | 21.7% | 13.6% | 2.3× | 3,560 |
| PLTR | $414.4B | 275.1× | 286.8× | 92.6× | 56.2% | 82.4% | 36.3% | 22.0% | 22.0% | — | 2,883 |
| DELL | $348.4B | 61.5× | 33.0× | 3.1× | 18.8% | 20.0% | 5.2% | -240% | 20.4% | 2.8× | 1,564 |
| LRCX | $347.0B | 65.9× | 55.4× | 18.8× | 23.7% | 48.7% | 29.1% | 54.3% | 37.4% | 0.7× | 2,500 |
| AMAT | $336.4B | 49.0× | 38.7× | 11.9× | 4.4% | 48.7% | 24.7% | 34.3% | 25.9% | 0.8× | 2,826 |
| RPAY | $316.6B | — | — | 1023.6× | -1.2% | 75.0% | -83.0% | -53.0% | -28.2% | -1.7× | 142 |
| UMC | $275.1B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 302 |
| SAP | $268.2B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 794 |
| ARM | $254.3B | 281.2× | 218.9× | 51.7× | 22.8% | 97.5% | 18.4% | 10.9% | 10.9% | — | 730 |
| PANW | $249.8B | 233.7× | 156.0× | 27.1× | 14.9% | 73.4% | 12.3% | 14.5% | 14.5% | — | 2,374 |
| CRM | $241.0B | 33.3× | 26.0× | 5.8× | 9.6% | 77.7% | 18.0% | 12.6% | 10.1% | 1.5× | 2,547 |
| TXN | $239.4B | 48.3× | 31.5× | 13.5× | 13.0% | 57.0% | 28.3% | 30.7% | 16.5% | 1.8× | 2,345 |
| ANET | $236.0B | 68.3× | 59.6× | 26.2× | 28.6% | 64.1% | 39.0% | 28.4% | 28.4% | — | 1,930 |
| IBM | $233.4B | 22.3× | — | 3.5× | 7.6% | 58.2% | 15.7% | 32.4% | 11.3% | — | 3,351 |
| SNDK | $226.6B | — | — | 30.8× | 10.4% | 30.1% | -22.3% | -17.8% | -14.8% | -1.5× | 1,127 |
| QCOM | $193.5B | 36.0× | 14.5× | 4.4× | 13.7% | 55.4% | 12.5% | 26.1% | 15.4% | 1.1× | 2,611 |
| MRVL | $185.4B | 71.3× | 121.2× | 22.6× | 42.1% | 51.0% | 32.6% | 18.7% | 14.2% | 2.9× | 1,477 |
Peers = companies sharing SAP's sector (Technology) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.